Abstract This paper analyses the choice of the optimal lease term of office property in relation to
Introduction
Lease term, renewed rent and expected vacancy risk form a cohesive set of variables in determining the leasing contract of office properties. The cost of vacancy is important, particularly at times when vacancy rates are comparatively high. The expected cost of vacancy depends on the expected lag vacancy multiplied by the rental income for the property. The lease term refers to the initial contract lease period which varies from two years at the short end, to as long as 60 years. In a survey conducted by Gallup for Richard Ellis in 1994, length of lease was cited by two/three of the respondents as one of the most important factors behind property lending in London [1] . After the primary lease term expires, units are expected to remain vacant for a period of time, although how long depends on market conditions. This vacancy in between consecutive leases is referred to as lag vacancy (Dreyer and Mathieson, 1995) . If L and N, respectively, are the expected lag vacancy and lease term, then the expected vacancy rate is v = L/N.
The landlord may choose a short-term contract that sets the rent for the first period only, leaving everything else open to negotiation at the beginning of the second period; or a long-term contract that fixes the rent for both periods. However, rent review is less flexible in long-term contracts. A landlord who anticipates a moderate rise in rents will be more likely to enter into a long-term lease. If the landlord is averse to risk, he can sacrifice some expected rental rates for a reduction in vacancy risk in rental renegotiation. It appears that shorter Journal of Property Investment & Finance, Vol. 17 No. 1, 1999, pp. 75-88 . © MCB University Press, 1463-578X JPIF 17,1
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leases afford less protection to the landlord and are tenant-oriented. Entering a long-term, non-cancellable lease may reduce the landlord's uncertainty. Against this background, the landlord will compare the expected cost of lag vacancy against flexibility of rent review. There are a number of articles on the relationship between leasing and rents. Rowland (1996a; 1996b) studies how a rent, inclusive of property running costs, is adjusted to its equivalent net rent. Benjamin et al. (1995) showed the moral hazard problems associated with a tenant's incentive to under-maintain or overuse a leased property. Brown (1995) , using the discounted cash flow model, shows that lease incentives will distort the rental value market without any effect on the open market valuation of properties. The model employed by Jefferies (1994) also estimates the effective rent which has been undervalued. Dreyer and Mathieson (1995) , using a simple one-period model, estimate the lag vacancy rate for a given probability of renewal. However, the impact of expected vacancy risk on the choice of lease term remains under-researched. It should be noted that effective rentals allowing all incentives are unobservable. Comparisons of the rental costs of office premises require adjustment of rents to take account of the differing lease terms and varying rent free periods. The terms of a lease should include any effect of rent-free periods granted for comparable lettings, and various user restrictions in arriving at the rental value for the premises. Consideration should therefore be given to concessions included in the lease contract. Concessions that would overstate the actual rental received include unusually long lease length, low security deposits, a longer rent-free period of occupancy, and the provision by the landlord of expensive interior partitioning in offices. This paper is the first to provide a theoretical framework which includes highlighting the relationship between the optimal lease length and the expected lag vacancy; the rate of rental growth; the rent-free period and risks. The next section shows how the effective rents can be estimated based on the lease term, expected lag vacancy and rent-free period. The following sections examine how contract length can be used as a device for insuring vacancy risk. We will derive the optimal lease length by balancing the benefits of a shorter lease length against the landlord's increased expected contract negotiation costs. Comparative statics are used to show how the optimal lease length is affected by the parameters of the model. Concerns expressed in relation to risk factors in choosing a lease term have also been discussed.
Effective rents
While a tenant will leave after the expiration of one lease term, there is an expected lag vacancy because the property is unlikely to be rented out immediately. In order to determine the effective rental value, the most simplistic approach is to assess the total rent paid by the tenant after the lag vacancy period and rent-free period has ended and spread this over the total time period. Thus the lease incentives can be viewed as a repackaging of the rental stream. The renewal of a lease could be viewed as an option (Brown, 1995) [2] .
Assume that the lag vacancy (L) is in the period [0, L] and the rent-free period
Let r be the discount rate. To spread the present value of the total rent paid by the tenant after the lag vacancy and rent-free period ended over the total time N, we have (1) Since the rental income stream R is constant in that period, the effective rent (ER) incorporating the lag vacancy and rent-free period, can be derived as follows (Appendix 1):
(2) subject to N > F > 0 and r > 0. It can be shown that ∂ER/∂N > 0 and ∂EP/∂L < 0 (Figure 1 ). For example, let r = 10 per cent and R = 1,000. If the expected time to re-lease the property (i.e. lag vacancy) is three months (then the vacancy rate is 3/36 = 8.3 per cent) and the rent-free period F is two months, the effective rent will be ER = 0.913 × 1,000 = 913 for a lease term of three years. This means that the lag vacancy and rent-free period is equivalent to a cost of 8.7 per cent of the nominal/face rental income. Suppose the discount rate (r) decreases to 5 per cent, then the corresponding effective rent increases to 929. Clearly, the effective rent decreases when the rent-free period increases (Figure 2 ), but increases when the discount rate decreases (Figure 3) .
In case the tenant renews the lease at the end of the lease term, the lag vacancy will become zero. This means that the lag is probabilistic. In general, 
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the expected lag vacancy L can be regarded as a probability density function f (x) such that
The uncertainty of renewal occurs at the review date when the rent is renegotiated. After that has taken place, the vacancy risk concerning the lease has been resolved and the rent is then fixed again until the next review. 
Optimal lease term
In the period between rent reviews, rents are fixed in nominal terms. The landlord is unable to adjust the rental according to market condition if a lease with relatively long rent review periods is chosen. In this case, the nominal rent will remain at the current level for some time and cannot increase to compensate the landlord for higher levels of inflation. On the other hand, the expected cost of vacancy will be high if a relatively short lease term is adopted because of the risk of lag vacancy on renewal, especially when the property market is in slump. Moreover, short-term leasing involves higher costs in searching for information, further negotiation and redrafting documentation. Especially, concessions, such as rent-free periods, need to be provided when the leases are renegotiated. The landlord will choose the optimal lease term to maximize total expected income from the rental property. To simplify the exposition of fairly complex ideas, this paper assumes that the landlord has two options: choosing two shorter lease terms, with lease length equal to N and M; or choosing a longer lease term with lease length equal to (N + M). The expected lag vacancy, which is independent of the lease terms, is assumed to be L, and the mean period of rent free is F. We assume that an initial lag vacancy and rent-free period are involved in every rental negotiation. While a long year term helps to reduce vacancy risk, short year term allows the contract rent to be reviewed closely to the effective open market rent. Regarding the initial shortterm lease (lease length = N), the rent (R) is assumed to be reviewed upward by a rate of g on renewal. For simplicity, we assume that there are no leasing commissions and expenses for renewing tenants. If the lease term on renewal is M, the total expected rental income for the two combined lease terms will be[3]:
If the initial lease term chosen is (N + M) and the lag vacancy is L, the total expected rental income received is:
The landlord will prefer the longer lease term to the shorter one on the condition that Y > X. Combining equations (4) and (5) yields (Appendix 2):
, where M > L; F and r > 0. However, g is continuous at r = 0, in which case g = 0. This shows that there is interdependence between the expected lag vacancy, rent-free period and rental incremental rate while choosing a lease term. For example, a three-year lease term with an expected lag vacancy of L = three months would require to arrive at an expected rental rate of growth more than 9.5 per cent (assume r = 10 per cent and F = two months) [4] , so that the shorter lease term will be chosen (see Table I ). In this case, the valuer considers a twoyear lease contract with an expected rental rate of growth 9.5 per cent as likely as one of a five-year lease contract. It is interesting to note that the expected rental rate of growth depends only on (the second lease term) M, and not N. More generally, g increases when r, L and F increase. Booth (1993) shows that the present value of property with a longer rent review period will be more sensitive to a rise in inflationary expectations. Properties with longer rent review periods are closer to fixed interest securities, since rents are fixed in nominal terms for a longer time period. However, the present value of a property with different lease terms should be the same because opportunities for arbitrage will eliminate disequilibrium in the market. Equilibrium condition implies that g = (e -rM -e -r(M+L) + e -r(L+F) -1)/(e -rMe -rF ) e -rF , in which case, the landlord will be indifferent in choosing any one of the two lease terms. This implies that the expected lag vacancy can be transformed equivalently into the expected rental growth rate, such that g increases when L increases. Alternatively, the optimal lease term (M * ) to be chosen by the landlord can be expressed as (6) Equation (6) implies that M * is always positive since e -rF < 1. For example, let r = 8 per cent, g = 15 per cent and F = two months. The optimal lease term M * increases from 42 to 52 months when L increases from three to four months, whereas M * decreases from 42 to 35 months when the expected rate of rental growth g increases from 15 to 18 per cent. In addition, the optimal lease term increases from 42 to 52 months when the rent-free period increases from two to three months. More generally, it can be proved that the optimal lease term increases when the expected lag vacancy and/or the discount rate increases, ceteris paribus. The relationship between the optimal values of M * and L is depicted in Figure 4 . It appears that the optimal lease length (M * ) is more sensitive to the lag vacancy (L) when the discount rate (r) is at a relatively high level.
In Figure 5 , clearly, ∂M * /∂r > 0. As is seen, the M * function shifts from I to III when g decreases from 12 to 8 per cent, ceteris paribus. An increase in the discount rate is to reduce the expected real rental growth rate. The M * function further shifts from III to IV when L increases from 3 to 3.3 months. It should be noted that the optimal lease term becomes very sensitive to the discount rate when the expected rate of rental growth is at a relatively low level and/or the expected lag vacancy is at a relatively high level. The rent-free periods can also fit into the above analysis. Equation (6) shows that the optimal lease length increases when rent-free period F increases. There is a tendency for landlords to offer concessions to tenants rather than lowering the face/nominal rent and providing the tenant with fitting out allowances. It is because lowering the face rent for one particular tenant will affect other rental negotiations [5] . Thus, rent-free period is a more flexible concession in the contractual arrangements. However, as was discussed earlier, an increase in rent-free period actually means a decrease in effective rents. Practitioners can use this concept to assess the appropriate lease length, and to estimate effective rents of different lease terms.
Risk factors in choosing lease term (a) Uncertainty
We have shown that there is a cost attached to frequent contract negotiations that is not present in a long contract. A long lease length can provide the landlord with a means of guaranteeing a certain level of rental from the property. Thus, risky cash flow from the property is the major cost of renegotiating a new contract. However, different properties may have different volatility of rental movement. Especially properties without rental comparables in the locality which do not have a rental history may exhibit a more volatile rental movement. This volatility risk is compensated for by the addition of a risk premium to the discount rate. It follows that a greater rental volatility leads to a higher discount rate, which will in turn call for a longer lease term in order to offset the increased risks. But the risk premium varies with investors' anticipations of inflation, from time to time and from one property to another. Fiedler and Schweitzer (1995) argue that the determination of the appropriate risk premium requires the investor not only to have a view of the current trends and circumstances of just one asset group, but a judgement of the current expectations for competitive asset groups as well. The risk premium is strongly affected by the market expectations. For instance, a decrease in real estate values generally will lead to a loss of perceived wealth, decline in levels of optimism and reduction in expectations for future value increases. Such expectations will in turn bring about a decrease in space demand for offices. Risk premium can be measured by computing variability in annual return. With volatile office rental levels, many landlords and tenants are naturally confused as to where rental levels actually stand when their rent review or lease renewal approaches (see Smith, 1995, for related discussion). There are errors in estimating the expected lag vacancy and expected rental growth rate which can have significant impacts on the choice of lease terms. Property valuations are usually undertaken in an environment of uncertainty and incomplete information. It makes sense for a valuer to consider the previous rental income growth (possibly adjusted for risks) before arriving at the optimal lease length. Using ex post return premiums over long time periods as proxies for ex ante premiums is probably the most convenient way we can do this. The exact measure of rental growth based on expectations is difficult. It is because expected rental values are likely to be biased: upwards during economic expansion and downwards during contraction (Born and Pyhrr, 1994) . In some cases, the additional rent may reflect part of an increase in operating expenses (Murtaugh and Daspin, 1994) . Future property operating costs can also be hard to estimate.
On the other hand, expected lag vacancy has become associated with the negotiation process. In general, expected lag vacancy and negotiation time decrease as the time cost of negotiation (discount rate) increases. The discount rate is the nominal opportunity cost, which incorporates general economy-wide inflation, and should contain a risk premium above the return to riskless assets. It has been argued that the discount rate should also reflect illiquidity or other sources of disutility in unsecuritized real estate investments compared to securities (Ibbotson and Siegel, 1984) . Office properties, confronted by a greater dispersion of prices, are expected to have a longer negotiation time.
(b) Market structures
The above model assumes that the optimal lease term is the one that mimimizes the expected costs of contract negotiation from the perspective of landlords. However, in a competitive market, landlords and tenants can negotiate lease terms and exchange rental concessions for lease responsibilities to arrive at a lease structure under which the combined values of the landlord's interest and the tenant's interest are maximized. If the property market is characterised by oligopoly powers held by a small group of landlords, the owners will be able to dictate the lease terms, rather than freely negotiate them (Rowland, 1996b) .
The effect of oligopoly usually occurs in some highly specialised properties which are equipped with special design or facilities required by certain categories of tenants, such as medical practitioners or high-tech operations. However, the initial negotiation between landlords and tenants also depends very much on the market conditions. Landlords will be able to pass on to their tenants most of the operating costs, including the costs due to vacancy risks, when the demand for office space is strong relative to its supply. However, during recessionary times, the vacancy risks will be much greater for highly specialised properties than for general purpose ones. It therefore follows that specialised properties tend to be leased for longer periods than general purpose ones (Rowland, 1996b) . In general, specialised properties have higher vacancy risks. Higher risks give rise to a higher discount rate, and therefore lead to a longer lease term. The landlord's expected costs of renegotiating a new contract may rise as a result because the risk of searching for a new tenant presumably exceeds the benefit of higher rental prospects. The effect on M * of changes in the discount rate r was shown in Figure 5 . Thus, considerations should be given to the nature of the property in determining the discount rate. Reinforcing this effect is the fact that a longer contract duration is less costly, when future rentals are discounted at a higher rate. When the discount rate increases, the present value of expected rentals is lower for a given contract length. In other words, an increase in the discount rate will lead to a fall of the marginal cost of a longer lease length.
(c) Tenancy default
The lease term is further complicated by the need to consider the uniqueness of the locational and physical characteristics of each property as well as the expected tenancy defaults, the riskiness of market sectors and the legal intricacies of the contract between landlord and tenant (Crosby and Murdoch, 1994; Murdoch, 1994) . As was discussed earlier, the discount rate (r) comprises the risk-free rate, an inflation consideration and the relative volatility of the rental income from the property. Investors prefer a reliable, though conservative, income stream. Thus real estate which gives both high returns and a high risk may be unattractive. Risk can be classified as either market risk or specific risk. Market risk comes from external changes which are uncontrollable, but specific risk is the unique risk associated with a particular investment or portfolio of investments [6] . For example, the expected lag vacancy of an office building, with nearly all of its leases expiring within a short period of time, would certainly be higher than one in which the lease expiration dates were evenly distributed over the next year.
Lease contracts with frequent change of tenants may carry a higher tenant credit risk because a tenant may fail to pay all of the contractually owed rent. Landlords can grant a tenure discount to prevent good tenants from moving. The tenure discount serves to reduce the turnover of good tenants and to increase the turnover of bad tenants. Conversely, a lower tenure discount implies a higher tenant credit risk in rental renegotiation, in which case a longer lease term is desirable. In equilibrium, low rents and a low turnover of good tenants, as well as high rents accompanied by a high turnover of bad tenants, contribute to the tenure discount. Bad tenants represent a form of market risk. Owing to imperfect information, bad tenants have an incentive to conceal their type in order to obtain more favourable contract terms. Hence, the combination of a higher tenure discount and a longer lease term could help to reduce the turnover of good tenants. It should be noted that the quality of the cash flows for a single tenant building are much more dependent on the quality of the lease and the relationship with the tenant than are multi-tenant properties.
(d) Long-term relationship
While many commercial leases comprise a longer term than the average residential lease, long leases may include provision for the renegotiation of the rent at specified times during the lease [7] . It is also common to see leases with an option of renewal only at the end of the tenancy at the open market rent. However, properties acquired on low initial rental yields with high growth prospects tend to accompany a short initial lease term. Any landlord who settles for a bad lease, may actually be devaluing his property by restricting his income stream for a lease period of three or even five years. A lease with uneconomical rental terms represents a lost opportunity to boost the value of the property. Thus, as more favourable market conditions come, landlords tend to focus not on just filling space but on maximizing and sustaining the value of their properties by negotiating leases on the basis of a long-term business plan of value enhancement (Hayman and Ulrick, 1995) . If the parties are commencing a long-term relationship, initial rental negotiation will be more important in long-term than short-term leases. In general, the lease length, the statutory rights to renew, and the basis of rent reviews would influence the allocation of risk bearing between the landlord and tenant. While altering the lease length will change the risks taken by the landlord, risks can be divided or shifted through contractual arrangements. The risks will be reflected in the discount rate r, thereby affecting the optimal lease term.
A long-term contract also helps to keep the cost of maintenance and administration low (Hubert, 1995) . By contrast, the shorter the lease term, the greater the likelihood is that the lessee will not fully take good care in using the property (Flath, 1980) . In general, the longer the lease term, the more the effective ownership of the property is transferred to the tenant. DiPasquale and Wheaton (1996) argue that with a very long lease term, the landlord has implicitly sold the rights to an uncertain market income stream in exchange for the present discounted value of all lease payments.
We have shown that contracts with different lease lengths can be valued and compared. For instance, a landlord may be especially motivated to offer a below-market rent for an office property; the valuer's service to the client under the current practice is to alert the client to the situation and explain that measuring the effective rental of the contract is not ordinarily undertaken. The estimates provided are, however, beyond a standard valuation's scope. A more comprehensive valuation would help the valuer understand the varying views of the lease term likely to be taken by prospective landlords and the change of lease length may be achieved through sensitivity analysis, using the model. Moreover, valuers cannot avoid considering the future. Valuers not only provide a one-number answer but address the need for risk assessment in its complexity. Since risks are valued as direct costs perceived by market participants, the valuer must also have a feel of the market (Peto et al., 1996) .
Conclusions
Rents are fixed within a lease term. The landlord is unable to adjust the rental according to market condition if a relatively long lease term is chosen. However, the expected cost of vacancy will be high if a relatively short lease term is used, especially when the property market is very competitive. Moreover, short-term leasing involves higher costs in searching for information, further negotiation and redrafting documentation. Especially, concessions, such as rent-free periods, need to be provided when the leases are renegotiated. Thus the landlord will choose the optimal lease term to maximize total income from the rental property. This paper shows that there is interdependence between the expected lag vacancy, rental growth rate and rent-free periods while choosing a lease term. However, the future path of rentals is not known with certainty. An expected lag vacancy would require a higher expected rental growth rate. Specifically, the expected lag vacancy can be transformed into a cost which reduces effective rents.
The optimal lease length is chosen by the landlord to balance the benefits of a short lease length with the expected cost of renegotiating a new contract. Risks will, however, be reflected in the discount rate, thereby affecting the optimal lease term. We show that if two shorter lease terms are chosen, the expected rental rate of growth does not affect the initial lease term. More generally, the optimal lease term tends to increase when the discount rate, expected lag vacancy, and rent-free periods increase. However, rent volatility, bad tenancy, imperfect expectations as well as negotiation process would affect the predictions of a risk premium in the choice of lease terms through affecting the expected rental growth.
Although land economists and valuers are expected to benefit from our analysis of the optimal lease term, there are still many problems associated with the estimates of the discount rate r and expected rental growth rate g. Needless to say, it is important to recognize these, and also to look out for future research to help address these problems.
Notes
1. The shorter lease structure is prevalent within Europe (Adair et al., 1994) . In a sample of 7,000 US office leases that were brokered in 1989 by CB Commercial, it is found that the mean lease length is five years, but no leases are longer than 12 years (DiPasquale and Wheaton, 1996) . In the UK, the common lease term is five to ten years. The Asia-Pacific markets appear to have the shortest leases. In Hong Kong's office property, the market displays lease terms of three to five years. In Japan, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, leases are commonly for two to three years and in China, Taiwan and Korea one to two years (Hillier Parker, 1994) . 2. A lease is defined as a contractual arrangement for trading the rights to temporary use of an object, but not the rights to all possible future uses. In general, the discount rate r equals real return plus inflation plus risk premium. 5. With free access to information, landlords continually act to acquire information on market conditions. In imperfectly competitive markets, prices do not fully adjust to all potentially available information. Landlords possessing market power may choose to set rental rates which are either biased or not adjusted to all available information so as to distort their information content (Andersen and Hviid, 1994) . For instance, during recessionary times, a tenant lease may not be signed if the rental rate is depressed. 6. In theory, inflation-indexed rents can transfer the risk of inflation from landlords to tenants, but it is impractical in reality because rents only adjust in the new and vacant office market, but do not adjust in the occupied market. 7. For instance, a six-year term with a rent review after the third year.
